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INTRODUCTION
If a man is hot on a summer’s day in Los Angeles1 or Newport Beach,2
California, he could simply take his shirt off to help him cool down. When he does
this, no one would even bat an eyelash. On that same day, on that same street, a
woman would be guilty of a misdemeanor, fined and possibly jailed, for doing the
exact same thing. Laws discriminating on the basis of a woman’s anatomy bear no
relationship to a woman’s capabilities or role in society; they merely subjugate her
to a second-class citizenship solely because of the way society sexualizes her body.
In order to defend prohibitions on general, public female toplessness,
proponents equate it to nude or topless dancing and import the same justifications
to ban it.3 For example, the Newport Beach City Council declared that the intent of
its public nudity ordinance is “to eliminate . . . the secondary effects associated with
the presentation of nudity in adult-oriented establishments.”4 This false equivalence
codifies the fetishization of a woman’s body into law and leads to an absurd result.
This reasoning rests on the faulty premise that the two acts are essentially
interchangeable and share the same purpose. It follows that any time a woman is
topless in public she is doing it solely to attract attention and making her body a
constant spectacle for the public’s enjoyment and sexual pleasure. This reasoning
neglects the multitude of benign reasons why a woman would want to be topless in
public, such as to cool off, to avoid tan lines, or to feel free from the encumbrances
of straps and bands.
Female topless prohibitions are the embodiment of gender discrimination. It
is one of the remaining laws that blatantly treat men and women differently on the
basis of how society views their bodies and the biological differences between the
sexes. Paternalistic notions that a woman needs the laws to protect her from a man’s
gaze and his uncontrollable desire to touch her if he sees her bare chest undermine
the struggle for gender equality. It is a modern example that a woman’s body is
deemed lesser than a man’s. The justifications for these laws are faulty and based
on flawed logic that can be traced from the Women’s Suffrage movement in
England and America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the
2016 election. This Note will show that there is no important governmental
objective that justifies making it a crime for a woman to be topless in public, just as
there was no important objective that justifies prohibiting women from voting,
becoming a lawyer, attending a prestigious military academy, or fighting in the
military.

1. L.A., CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.04.480 (1971).
2. NEWPORT BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10.54.010–030 (1975).
3. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2000) (upholding a Pennsylvania public
nudity ordinance); Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding that an Indiana public
indecency law that required nude dancers to wear pasties and a G-string did not violate the First
Amendment).
4. NEWPORT BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10.54.010–030 (1975).
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In Part I, this Note examines the Constitutional implications of female
toplessness laws. More specifically, it demonstrates how female toplessness laws
ought to fail under an Equal Protection framework and illustrates why the First
Amendment has been incorrectly applied to general toplessness. In Part II, this
Note will argue that many of the justifications proponents set forth, based on
protecting morality, public order, and ending sexual violence against women, are
irrelevant to the issue of topless female sunbathing, and provide no valid
justifications for these laws. Further, in Part III, this Note will analyze other
arguments in favor of lifting these bans, including the negative effects these laws
have on men and women. Finally, in Part IV, the Note will conclude with
illustrations of some ways society has already demonstrated a willingness to
liberalize these laws and its perceptions of women’s bodies.
I. FEMALE TOPLESSNESS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNING
The foundation of gender equality is to ensure that men and women enjoy the
same rights and opportunities across all sectors of society. It means that rights,
responsibilities, and opportunities will not depend on whether a person is born male
or female.5 Banning a woman from being topless limits her rights, not just based on
her gender, but also based on how society views her gender. In order for women to
achieve total equality in America, society must view all gendered bodies on equal
footing. Men and women are already not allowed to show their genitalia,6 but only
women are not allowed to be topless in public.
A. Equal Protection Doctrine
Sex is an immutable characteristic determined by accident of birth. As such,
the Supreme Court has held that any law that is based on a discriminatory
classification, must “at least … serve[ ] important governmental objectives and
[ ] the discriminatory means employed [must be] substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.”7 Female toplessness laws are a modern-day
example of intentional discrimination by the government based on traditional
(sexist) notions of women in society. However, the Supreme Court has consistently
ruled that traditional notions of sex cannot be used to justify a discriminatory law.8
The imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex “because
of their sex would seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
5. Gender Mainstreaming, EUR. INST. FOR GENDER EQUALITY, http://eige.europa.eu/
gender-mainstreaming/concepts-and-definitions [ https://perma.cc/FJB2-MGKV ] ( last visited June
3, 2018).
6. See L.A., CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.04.480 (1971); NEWPORT BEACH, CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 10.54.010–030 (1975).
7. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a law based on the traditional view
that men were more qualified to administer estates than women). The Supreme Court in Reed and its
progeny slowly chipped away at the belief that men are more capable than women.
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should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.’”9 Therefore, they must
be deemed unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Sadly, this has not
been the case. Courts too often find governmental reliance on incorrect
descriptions and false analogies—that women’s bodies are sexual and comparable
to one’s genitalia.10
Female toplessness laws are an unjustifiable burden on women and bear no
justification in sound legal or societal principles. The common justifications for
these laws are based on antiquated Victorian and Judeo-Christian values that have
no place in our modern society.11 These laws are rationalized “by an attitude of
‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but
in a cage.”12 These laws find their origin in an era when women were legal secondclass citizens, whose “paramount destiny and mission . . . [were] to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother”13 and whose value was dictated on whether
they were chaste and modest. Women could not vote;14 women could not be heirs;15
women could not hold public office16 or be on juries;17 women could not bring
lawsuits in their own names.18 Married women were not even able to serve as legal
guardians of their own children19 and many were obligated to relinquish control of

9. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
10. See discussion infra Section II.C.
11. Sara Sheridan, Toplessnes - The One Victorian Taboo That Won’t Go Away, BBC NEWS
ONLINE, Nov. 15, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30052071 [ https://perma.cc/FT2DLFVW].
12. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
13. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Suffrage Wins in Senate; Now Goes to States, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 1919; see also Susan B. Anthony, On Women’s Right to Vote (1873) (transcript available
at DIGITAL HIST., http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtid=3&psid=3604
[ https://perma.cc/BE5E-52US] (last visited June 3, 2018)).
15. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (overturning Idaho code that stated that “[o]f several
persons claiming equally entitled . . . to administer [the estate of one who dies intestate], males must be
preferred to females . . . .”); cf. Thomas Edgar, The Law’s Resolutions of Women’s Rights; Or, the Law’s
Provision for Women, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE: EARLY SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY TOPICS 26, 30 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1765)) (noting that,
uncommonly, “[s]ome seventeenth-century men did . . . respect[ ] their [wives’] claims to inherited
estates”).
16. In 1949, Margaret Chase Smith became the first woman elected to the U.S. Senate
without previously being appointed to the office or filling a vacancy by the death of her
husband. See Smith, Margaret Chase, HIST., ARTS, & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES,
http://history.house.gov/People/Detail/21866 [ https://perma.cc/MM2X-CKA9] (last visited June
3, 2018).
17. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (prohibiting states from systematically
excluding women from jury service).
18. Edgar, supra note 15.
19. Harvard Bus. Sch., Women and the Law, WOMEN, ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y,
http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/wes/collections/women_law/ [ https://perma.cc/EQ3P-TBPP]
( last visited June 3, 2018).
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their property and earnings to their husbands.20 It is no surprise, then, that women
could not be topless in public.21
1. The Evolution of the Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s recognition of gender as a suspect classification arose
out of the women’s movement of the 1960s. By questioning the social and legal
understandings of the gendered divide, the women’s movement of the 1960s gave
rise to many of the key protections women enjoy today. It is with this backdrop that
Congress enacted key legislation prohibiting sex discrimination22 and the Senate
passed the Equal Rights Amendment (the “ERA”) on March 22, 1972.23 Further, a
unanimous Supreme Court held that statutory classifications on the basis of gender
are “subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause” of the Fourteenth
Amendment,24 reversing nearly a century’s old practice of refusing to extend the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to women.25
Between 1971 and 1976, the Supreme Court fundamentally altered its
treatment of gender discrimination. Starting with Reed v. Reed and Frontiero
v. Richardson in 1971 and 1973, respectfully, and ending with Craig v. Boren in 1976,
the Court laid the foundation for the gender discrimination jurisprudence that it still
relies on today. Prior to these cases, the Court had consistently relied on social and
biological differences between men and women to justify discriminatory treatment
under the law.26 In Reed v. Reed, a husband and wife conflicted over who could
be the administrator of the estate of their deceased son.27 At the time, Idaho
Probate Code specified that “males must be preferred to females” in appointed

20. Mary Beth Norton, “Either Married Or to Bee Married”: Women’s Legal Equality in Early
America, in INEQUALITY IN EARLY AMERICA 29, 34 (Carla Gardina Pestana & Sharon V. Salinger eds.,
1999); see also Edgar, supra note 15.
21. For much of American history, women were subject to social ridicule for wearing trousers.
See Nora Caplan-Bricker, Women Who Wear Pants: Still Somehow Controversial, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2016,
2:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2016/02/women_wearing_pants_
are_still_controversial.html [ https://perma.cc/RE5V-QCJF].
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255–57 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17); see also Education Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 335, 373–74 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 13, 86 Stat. 816, 903
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17); State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 122, 86
Stat. 919, 932; Nurses Training Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-158, § 11, 85 Stat. 465, 479–80;
Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-157, § 110, 85 Stat. 431, 461.
23. Eileen Shanahan, Equal Rights Amendment Is Approved by Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1972, at A1.
24. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
25. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1873) (declining to extend to women the
right to obtain a license to practice law under the Fourteenth Amendment).
26. See, e.g., id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”).
27. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71–72.
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administrators of estates.28 In striking down the law, Chief Justice Burger applied
the test for non-gender-based Equal Protection challenges: “A classification ‘must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”29 The Court declared the statute’s
preference “arbitrary” and a distinction that could not “stand in the face of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no State deny the equal protection of the
laws to any person within its jurisdiction.”30
The Court expanded its protections in Frontiero where eight Justices held that
classifications based on gender are inherently invidious and are unconstitutional.31
The Court struck down a law that required female military personnel to prove
dependency on their husbands in order to receive benefits; the law assumed
dependency of wives for male military personnel.32 The law, it found, was based on
the “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination . . . [that] in practical effect,
put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”33 However, the Court could not agree
on the level of judicial scrutiny that this classification warranted. The plurality,
penned by Justice Brennan, held that such classification was “inherently suspect,”
on par with race and national origin, and subject to “strict judicial scrutiny.” 34 The
concurrence, by Justice Powell, disagreed saying it is “unnecessary … to
characterize sex as a suspect class”35 and instead, found solace in Reed and the
ERA.36
The Court settled on a level of scrutiny three years later in Craig v. Boren.37
Unfortunately, Justice Brennan writing this time for the majority had forsaken the
28. Id. at 73.
29. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
30. Id. at 74.
31. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87, 690 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion)
(“As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members.”); id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 691–92 (Powell, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 678–79.
33. Id. at 684.
34. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (“With these considerations in mind, we can only
conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national
origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Applying the
analysis mandated by that stricter standard of review, it is clear that the statutory scheme now before
us is constitutionally invalid.”).
35. Id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 692 (noting that the ERA is a compelling reason to defer invoking strict scrutiny
because “. . . if adopted [it] will resolve the substance of this precise question.” He continued that “this
reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision [ratifying the ERA] which is
currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative
processes.”). While at the time this opinion was published in May of 1973, thirty states had already
ratified the ERA, ultimately it fell just three states shy of the requisite three-fourths. See Roberta
W. Francis, Ratification: State Ratification of the ERA, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT:
UNFINISHED BUSINESS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/
ratification.htm [ https://perma.cc/7HDP-DHRK] (last visited June 3, 2018).
37. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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standard of “strict judicial scrutiny”38 from Frontiero in favor of an “elevated or
‘intermediate’ level scrutiny.’”39 In Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma
statute that prohibited certain types of beer to be sold to men under the age of
twenty-one and women under the age of eighteen.40 The Court articulated the
following test, based on Reed and its progeny: “To withstand constitutional
challenge [under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment]
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”41 Applying this test, the
Court held that the law “invidiously discriminate[d] against males 18–20 years of
age” and that the State failed to show that “sex represent[ed] a legitimate, accurate
proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving.”42
2. The Doctrine Today
The modern Equal Protection doctrine’s intermediate scrutiny standard has
been clarified in two recent cases: Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan43 and
United States v. Virginia.44 Although recent decisions have not truly honored this
new standard,45 it is important to consider as this still remains good law.46
38. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
39. Craig, 429 U.S. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s test); id. at 210,
n.* (Powell, J., concurring) (articulating that the test will be viewed as a “middle-tier” because it is more
demanding than rational basis, and less demanding than strict scrutiny).
40. Id. at 191–92.
41. Id. at 197–99 (Brennan, J.); see also id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 204.
43. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 718 (1982).
44. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515 (1996).
45. See Virginia Milstead, Forbidding Female Toplessness: Why “Real Difference” Jurisprudence
Lacks “Support” and What Can Be Done About it, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 314–18 (2005) (arguing that
the Virginia standard has largely been ignored); see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2327 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The illegitimacy of using ‘made up tests’ to
‘displace longstanding national traditions as the primary determinant of what the Constitution means’
has long been apparent.”) (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 570 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Compare Nguyen
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001) (applying Virginia in name only, while
effectively applying the traditional version of intermediate scrutiny), with id. at 88–89 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the INS has not shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for the sexbased classification because the court did not adequately consider the effectiveness of a gender-neutral
law).
46. Many federal courts of appeals, including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, continue to
apply Virginia’s heightened scrutiny test for sex-discrimination. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana,
137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 528–30 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136
S. Ct. 2545 (2016), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom; Associated Gen. Contractors
of Am., San Diego Chapter, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 713 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2013);
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Ath. Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 693–95 (6th Cir. 2006); Hibbs v. Dep’t
of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 2001); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 712–
15 (9th Cir. 1997). In the Ninth Circuit, only Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. has applied the
“exceedingly persuasive justification” analysis at the court of appeals level; however, many Ninth
Circuit district courts have. See, e.g., Sassman v. Brown, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1234 (E.D. Cal. 2015),
appeal dismissed (Mar. 14, 2016), modified on reconsideration, No. 214CV01679MCEKJN, 2015 WL
8780632 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2015); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1073 (D. Idaho 2014).

First to Printer_Alisobhani (Do Not Delete)

306

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

8/30/2018 10:41 AM

[ Vol. 8:299

In Mississippi University for Women, the Court stated that:
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based
classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be taken
in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and
stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or
“protect” members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer
from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
illegitimate.47
The Court used this test to strike down the Mississippi University for Women’s
single-sex admissions policy.48 As a result of their discriminatory admissions policy,
the university would not admit a male nursing student applicant who was otherwise
qualified, solely because he was male.49
The pivotal case of the modern era regarding gender equality is Virginia.50 In
this 1996 decision, the Court with a seven-to-one opinion heightened the standard
for gender discrimination to “skeptical scrutiny” when it found Virginia Military
Institute’s exclusively male admissions policy unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment.51 By requiring that the government show an “exceedingly persuasive
justification,” the court imposed a stricter standard than intermediate scrutiny. The
Court declared: “State actors controlling the gates of opportunity … may not
exclude qualified individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females.’”52
Under the new “skeptical scrutiny”53 standard, the party seeking to defend a
classification must show “at least that the [challenged] classification serves

47. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724–25 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
684–85 (1973)).
48. Id. at 731:
Thus, considering both the asserted interest and the relationship between the interest and
the methods used by the State, we conclude that the State has fallen far short of establishing
the “exceedingly persuasive justification” needed to sustain the gender-based classification.
Accordingly, we hold that MUW’s policy of denying males the right to enroll for credit in its
School of Nursing violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
49. Id. at 720–21.
50. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515.
51. Id. at 534:
Measuring the record in this case against the review standard just described, we conclude
that Virginia has shown no “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding all women
from the citizen-soldier training afforded by VMI. We therefore affirm the Fourth Circuit’s
initial judgment, which held that Virginia had violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.
52. Id. at 541 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725).
53. Id. at 531:
We note, once again, the core instruction of this Court’s pathmarking decisions in
J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), and Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458
U.S. at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted): Parties who seek to defend gender-based
government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that
action.
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‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’
are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’”54 The Court
declared that, in order for an objective to be sufficient, “[t]he justification must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must
not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.”55 Many courts continue to follow these criteria
in order to determine whether an interest can justify the sex discrimination.56
B. First Amendment
“Being ‘in a state of nudity’ is not an inherently expressive condition.”57 Under
the Court’s declaration it would follow that the First Amendment is generally
inapplicable in instances of toplessness for toplessness’ sake because general
toplessness is not expressive conduct, but it would protect topless protesting which
is expressive. And yet, that is not the case in the majority of decisions.58 Perhaps

Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on
sex responds to volumes of history.
Id.
54. Id. at 533 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).
55. Id. (“The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response
to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities,
or preferences of males and females.”) (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 648 (1975);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223–24 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
56. Associated Gen. Contrs. of Am. v. Cal. Dept. of Transp., 713 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th
Cir. 2013); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Ath. Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 695 (6th Cir. 2006); MoralesSantana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 528–30 (2d Cir. 2006); Hibbs v. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844,
854 (9th Cir. 2001); Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 712–16 (9th Cir. 1997); Sassman
v. Brown, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (E.D. Cal. 2015); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho, 2014).
57. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (plurality opinion); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66
(1981)).
58. See Craft v. Hodel, 683 F. Supp. 289, 291 (D. Mass. 1988) (rejecting the argument “that [the
plaintiffs’] message of protest against exploitation is conveyed particularly by their nudity” and finding
that “this is only a matter of perspective” because “public nudity does not convey any specific message,
at most it is a medium by which a variety of messages may be conveyed”); Free the Nipple—Fort
Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1258 (D. Colo. 2016) (granting City of Fort Collins’
motion to dismiss in part with regards to plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim but otherwise denying it);
Free the Nipple—Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (D. Colo. 2017) (granting
preliminary injunction on Equal Protection Claim). But see People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007,
1012 (N.Y. City Ct. 1986) (finding that a New York public exposure penal statute was not
unconstitutional as applied to a group of women who went topless in a New York park to protest the
state’s public exposure law), rev’d 564 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1991); People v. Craft, 564 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1991),
rev’d sub nom. People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992). The court also justified the
discriminatory treatment under the Equal Protection Clause:
The State of course may treat males and females differently and not violate the Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States and New York State Constitutions provided the
unequal treatment is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental
concern. (Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)). This court finds
that the State’s objective in the passage of this statute is to protect the public from invasions
of its sensibilities and that it currently reflects community standards as to what constitutes
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because the same rules prohibit both forms of toplessness, both are prohibited. It
is also because courts fail to view a woman’s breasts as anything but a sexual object
that it must protect society against. Even when the conduct is expressive, courts
have used this reasoning to uphold female toplessness prohibitions like in the nude
and topless dancing context59 and also when it is not expressive (or when they deem
it non-expressive), like topless protesting. As a result, it is necessary to analyze the
ways the First Amendment has affected female toplessness.60 While there are some
courts that have protected female toplessness through the First Amendment, more
often than not, general toplessness gets lumped into the same category as nude
dancing and thus deemed “obscene,”61 or found not to be expressive and thus not
protected.
1. Expressive Conduct
The right to free speech is one of the fundamental tenets of our modern
society.62 The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law … abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press … .”63 It prohibits the government from
restricting expression, but it is not limitless prohibition. The Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence establishes that there are permissible restrictions on
speech. The First Amendment also protects speech when it is not on oratory or on
a page.
In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court recognized that communicative
conduct is not immune from government regulation.64 David Paul O’Brien burned
his Selective Services registration certificate in protest of the Vietnam War in
violation of federal law.65 As a result, he was indicted, convicted, and sentenced.66
O’Brien brought suit arguing that his conviction and the federal law violated the
nudity. As such, the prohibition under the statute as it applies to women is substantially
related to the achievement of an important governmental interest or concern.
Craft, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
However, it is important to note that this case was decided before Virginia, thus it is possible that the
court may have ruled the other way as a result of the stricter standard. See Reena Glazer, Note, Women’s
Body Image and the Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 113, 122–30 (1993).
59. By this, I mean nude dancing, where toplessness is also prohibited. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at
565 (holding that an Indiana public indecency law that required nude dancers to wear pasties and a Gstring did not violate the First Amendment); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (upholding a
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control regulation prohibiting nude dancing in places in
establishments licensed to sell alcohol as valid under the First Amendment).
60. See also Brenna Helppie-Schmieder, Note, The Constitution and Societal Norms: A Modern
Case for Female Breast Equality, 5 DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L. 1, 14–17 (2015); Danielle
Moriber, Note, A Right to Bare All? Female Public Toplessness and Dealing with the Laws that Prohibit, 8
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 453, 469 (2009).
61. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
62. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1237–38 (5th ed. 2017).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
65. Id. at 369. It was unlawful to knowingly destroy one’s Selective Service registration card
under 50 U.S.C. § 462(b) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 3811(b) (2015)). See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 370.
66. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
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First Amendment. The Court did not agree,67 laying out the following test for
symbolic conduct:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.68
The Court found that the government’s prohibition was “an appropriately
narrow means of protecting”69 its interest in maintaining a smooth functioning draft
system. It further justified O’Brien’s conviction “because the noncommunicative
impact of O’Brien’s act of burning his registration certificate frustrated the
Government’s interest.”70
The Supreme Court applied O’Brien to nude dancing vis-à-vis its
communication of “an erotic message.”71 In Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., the Court
noted that because nude dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters
of the First Amendment,”72 it is afforded some protections under the First
Amendment, but that some types of nude dancing may be regulated and are not
protected.73 Applying the four-part O’Brien test, the Court upheld an Indiana statute
that proscribed all instances of public nudity. The Court found that the law furthers
a substantial interest in “protecting societal order and morality.”74 The Court went
further to note that since public nudity is the evil the State seeks to prevent, the fact
that the law may have implications on expression is only incidental and not a cause
to strike it down.75
The blanket prohibitions in these ordinances fail the “greater than is
essential”76 test in O’Brien. Under this test, the ordinances are inherently overbroad
because they impose restrictions that are greater than is essential to further a
substantial government interest such as protecting children. The blanket
prohibitions neglect the fact that there are valid circumstances where it should be
67. Id. at 386.
68. Id. at 377. See also CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1119 (5th ed. 2015) (noting that the standard is very similar to the intermediate scrutiny standard);
Moriber, supra note 60, at 475.
69. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
70. Id.
71. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991).
72. Id. at 566.
73. Id. at 565–66.
74. Id. at 568–69 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (“[T]his Court
implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a conclusion to protect ‘the social
interest in order and morality.’”) (emphasis omitted) and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
(“The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially
moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed.”)).
75. Id. at 570.
76. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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acceptable for an adult female to determine that it will not be offensive for her to
be topless. Yet, these ordinances impose a blanket prohibition on public toplessness
altogether. Furthermore, these ordinances forget to consider alternative, less
restrictive, means to further its interests, such as to prohibit the time or place a
woman can be topless, like a children’s playground.
2. Nude Dancing, Sexual Speech, and Obscenity
Just as the First Amendment does not protect all instances of nude dancing,77
it does not protect obscenity.78 However, it may protect depictions of sex as the
court has noted how “sex and obscenity are not synonymous.”79 “Obscene material
is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest[;]” it is
not simply the portrayal of sex.80 The difference between sex and obscenity is laid
out by the following test:
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.81
The Court’s treatment of nude dancing, sex, and obscenity are best evinced in
three cases: Roth v. United States, Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, and Erie v. Pap’s A.M.82
In Roth, the Court acknowledged that a legislature could legitimately act to
protect ”the social interest in order and morality.”83 The Court furthered this
reasoning in Paris Adult Theatre to recognize that states have a legitimate interest in
regulating the commerce of obscene material in places of public accommodations.84
77. Compare California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118–19 (1972) ( holding that the California
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control could regulate nude dancing in places that sell liquor), and
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560 ( holding that the State government may ban nude dancing entirely), with Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (finding a municipal ordinance that prohibited
all live entertainment in a commercial area was unconstitutionally overbroad ).
78. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957) (“[I]mplicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. . . . We hold
that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”); see also Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973) (reaffirming that obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment and remanding to determine whether mass mailings depicting sexually explicit material are
obscene and not protected by the First Amendment); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)
(holding that states have the power to make laws prohibiting obscenity; upholding a Georgia obscenity
law that prohibits the showing of pornographic films).
79. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
80. Id.
81. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
82. See Roth, 354 U.S. 476; Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49; City of Erie v. Pap’s
A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
83. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
84. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69.
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However, the Court limited a state’s power to censor “obscene” material to
“depiction[s] and description[s] of specifically defined sexual conduct … .”85 In
Paris Adult Theatre, the Court stated that: “The States have the power to make a
morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce
in such material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger
the public safety, or to jeopardize, in Mr. Chief Justice Warren’s words, the States’
‘right … to maintain a decent society.’”86 Finally, in Erie, the Court upheld an
ordinance passed by the city of Erie, Pennsylvania requiring live dancers to wear at
least “pasties” and a “G-string.”87 The city adopted the ordinance “for the purpose
of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the City, which
activity adversely impacts and threatens to impact on the public health, safety and
welfare by providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment,
public intoxication, prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and
other deleterious effects.”88 A plurality found that the ordinance was justified to
combat nude dancing’s “secondary effects.” The court found that nude dancing is
expressive conduct that is subject to the First Amendment but that being “in a state
of nudity” is not an inherently expressive condition.89
The Supreme Court has made it clear that nudity alone is not enough to make
speech unprotected.90 Unfortunately, lower courts have not followed this reasoning.
II. BREAKING [DOWN] THE OPPOSITION
In Virginia, the Court recognized that while diversity in education may be a
noble justification, it is not a sufficient justification for the sex-based discrimination

85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) ( Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 291, 296 (2000) (upholding a Pennsylvania public nudity ordinance):
We conclude that the [City’s] asserted interest in combatting the negative secondary
effects associated with adult entertainment establishments . . . is unrelated to the suppression
of the erotic message conveyed by nude dancing.
. . . The asserted interests of regulating conduct through a public nudity ban and of
combating the harmful secondary effects associated with nude dancing are undeniably
important.
Id. at 296.
88. Id. at 290 (citing Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 553 Pa. 348, 359 (1998), rev’d, 529 U.S. 277
(2000)).
89. Id. at 289.
90. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 207, 213 (1975) (declaring unconstitutional
an ordinance that prohibits the exhibition of any motion picture “in which the human male or female
bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are shown if such motion
picture . . . is visible from any public street or public place.”):
[A]ll nudity cannot be deemed obscene, even as to minors. Nor can such a broad restriction
be justified by any other governmental interest pertaining to minors. Speech that is
neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be
suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks
unsuitable . . . .
Id. at 213 (citation omitted). See also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981)
(“[N]ude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulations.”).
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in Virginia’s Military School.91 Similarly, while ending sexual violence and
promoting public morality may be valid justifications to prohibit nude dancing, they
are not substantially related to the prohibition on topless sunbathing. Unlike nude
dancing, which is done for the express purpose of a performance and in many
instances to sexually gratify an audience, the act of being topless or topless
sunbathing has no relation to an intended audience.
The arguments in favor discussed below are based on the most commonlycited reasons to ban female toplessness, based on the cases that have upheld female
topless prohibitions, including nude dancing prohibitions, as well as in the text of
some of the ordinances.92 The main justifications for female toplessness include the
need to preserve public order and morality, to combat sexual violence, and that
women’s breasts are different than men’s.
Last, critics and advocates of female toplessness have largely focused on the
women who are affected by these laws. However, these laws also harm men. Since
many of the Court’s principal gender discrimination decisions involve suits brought
by men,93 this Part will also explore some of the arguments men can raise in order
to challenge these laws. These laws perpetuate a negative stereotype of men: that
they become vulgar, thuggish, sadistic monsters at the sight of a woman’s flesh. The
underlying rationale behind the justification of combatting sexual violence is
precisely if men were able to control themselves, then women would not need to
cover up.94

91. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 n.80 (1996).
92. See, e.g., NEWPORT BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10.54.010–030 (1975).
93. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 718 (1982) (brought by a male
nursing applicant); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 190 (1976) ( brought on behalf of men eighteen to
twenty years old); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 677 (1973) ( brought on behalf of women in
the military on the basis of discriminatory treatment against husband-dependents).
94. Similar arguments have been made across cultures. Ironically, in places where the
veil is mandatory, sexual harassment seems to be more prevalent. See Tehran Bureau Chief,
How the Hijab Has Made Sexual Harassment Worse in Iran, GUARDIAN, Sept. 15, 2015,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/sep/15/iran-hijab-backfired-sexual-harassment
[ https://perma.cc/U48A-PXLG] (describing how women in Iran faced increased unwanted sexual
attention, more akin to “hunting” after the Hijab):
What is peculiar about Iran, as opposed to other nations in the region, is that it does not
have a long tradition of requiring women to cover up. In fact, up until 1979 Iranian women
looked no different than any woman in Europe or America, they could wear mini jupes and
short dresses, and anecdotally, sexual harassment was not as prevalent as it is today. Fast
forward thirty years, a generation of men and more have become trained to think of women
as sexual objects and have lost all sense of self-control. Even, the sight of a woman’s ankle,
will excite men beyond belief.
Id. In a post about a brother recounting how his sister’s full hijab invited unwanted sexual attention,
Josh Shahryar recounts:
The men who passed us on sidewalks would say demeaning things—things sexual in nature
that I was too young to understand. My mom and dad wanted me to walk her to school
because if I wasn’t with her, who knew what these men would do? I grew up hearing stories
about women being groped, punched, even abducted—all while wearing hijabs. The
perpetrators were from all ethnic groups and were both Pakistanis and, like us, refugees.
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A. False Morality
Despite the differences between nude dancing and female toplessness, the
government equates the two and posits the same justifications for its prohibitions.
One argument is to protect public order and morality and to combat sexual violence.
To date, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether it is permissible to
prohibit toplessness alone (meaning, when it is not in conjunction with dancing) on
the basis of morality. However, many appellate courts and some state courts have.
For instance, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals states that:
The important government interest is the widely recognized one of
protecting the moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of society that
still does not want to be exposed willy-nilly to public displays of various
portions of their fellow citizens’ anatomies that traditionally in this society
have been regarded as erogenous zones. These still include (whether
justifiably or not in the eyes of all) the female, but not the male, breast.95
More recently, an Indiana state court in C.T. v. Indiana applied reasoning from
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment ruling in Paris Adult Theater 96 and the
Fourth Circuit’s United States v. Biocic to uphold a public nudity statute against an
Equal Protection challenge.97 The C.T. court reasoned that in the absence of
authority stating that legislatures can no longer act to preserve order and morality,
protecting moral sensibilities is still an important justification.98 However, the court
neglected to consider the Supreme Court’s recent rulings which have questioned
reliance on morality to justify a discriminatory law.99
In Barnes, the Court acknowledged that Indiana’s public indecency statute100
“reflect[s] moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in
Josh Shahryar, The Myth of How the Hijab Protects Women Against Sexual Assault, WOMEN’S MEDIA
CENTER (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/the-myth-of-howthe-hijab-protects-women-against-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/65AP-GJHA].
95. United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1999).
96. See discussion supra Part I.B.
97. C.T. v. Indiana, 939 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
98. Id. at 629.
99. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
100. The Indiana Statute that was discussed in Barnes, section 35-45-4-1 of the 1988 Indiana
Code, provides in pertinent part:
Public indecency; Indecent exposure
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person;
commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) “Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with
less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered
male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (LexisNexis 1988); see also Aaron Brogdon, Improper Application of FirstAmendment Scrutiny to Conduct-Based Public Nudity Laws, Eric v. Pap’s A.M. Perpetuates the Conclusion
Created by Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 89 n.2 (2002).
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public places.”101 In justifying this conclusion, the Court relied on Bowers v.
Hardwick, a case where the Court upheld a Georgia statute that criminalized
sodomy.102 Continued reliance on Bowers, permitting morality as a legitimate
government interest, is unfounded; this reasoning was explicitly overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas in 2003:103
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making
the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to
condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior,
and respect for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial
concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral
principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of
their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us,
however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State
to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the
criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code.”104
Just as the long history of homophobia masked as morality, this nation has
applied that same reasoning to its sexist treatment of women’s bodies through its
laws. Lawrence explicitly questioned the use of one’s morality to justify a
discriminatory law, yet those in favor of female toplessness bans, such as the Fourth
Circuit and the Indiana court in C.T., rely on such arguments to ban female
toplessness.105 The morality, viewed in light of the Court’s previous decisions, is not
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for this blatant form of gender
discrimination.
As Lawrence noted, the reliance on morality is deeply connected to religion,
and specifically Judeo-Christian ideologies.106 The explicit use of such ideologies is
evidenced in a 1980s toplessness case from New York state court, People v. David.
107 While the case has since been invalidated because a subsequent state court case
found toplessness laws unconstitutional,108 the reasoning that the David court
applied has been followed in subsequent cases, such as C.T. In People v. David, Judge
Regan cited a passage from the Book of Genesis where Adam and Eve both realize
that they were naked and cover themselves up with fig leaves. He believes the use
nudity and man’s consciousness of it illustrate man’s knowledge of good and evil
and that one’s sense of embarrassment from one’s nudity is because nudity is evil
101. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991).
102. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986).
103. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
104. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
105. C.T. v. Indiana, 939 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
106. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
107. People v. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (1989), overruled on appeal by 585 N.Y.S.2d 149
(1991) (overruled on equal protection grounds).
108. People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875, 883 (1992) (finding New York’s public exposure law
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and state constitutions).
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and immoral.109 He argues that, “Judeo-Christian morality bans on public nudity”
are desirable to “reduce the incidence of public misbehavior”110 because, in the
Judeo-Christian ethic which, according to him, that the United States as a society
espouses, nudity is a catalyst for shame and immoral behavior and triggers a choice
between good and evil.
The use of morality and the Judeo-Christian ethic is illogical not only under its
own reasoning111 but more importantly as a foundation for a legal judgment. Judge
Regan assumes that Eve’s breasts were part of the immorality of nudity and that she
was ashamed to have them exposed,112 but even the most iconic depictions of Adam
and Eve throughout history show them with fig leaves covering only their genitalia,
not their chests.113 These celebrated images span centuries and civilizations and
hang in museums around the world. Many are proudly displayed at some of the
109. Glazer, supra note 58, at 125; David, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 567 (using the following passage from
Book of Genesis to justify a ruling against several women who were arrested for violating, now repealed,
New York Penal Law § 245.01):
So she took some of its fruit and ate it; and she also gave some to her husband, who was
with her, and he ate it.
7. Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized that they were naked, so
they sewed fig leaves together and made loin cloths for themselves.
8. When they heard the sound of the Lord God moving about in the garden at the breezy
time of the day, the man and his wife hid themselves from the Lord God among the trees
of the garden.
9. The Lord God then called to the man and asked him ”Where are you?”
10. He answered; I heard you in the garden but I was afraid, because I was naked, so I hid
myself.
11. Then the Lord God asked: “Who told you that you were naked?” You have eaten then
from the tree (of the knowledge of good and evil) of which I had forbidden you to eat!’
(Genesis 3:6-11.)
Id.
110. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
111. Undergoing the same literal close read of the passage from the Book of Genesis that the
David court did, it does not follow that nudity in and of itself is evil or immoral, nor does it follow that
female toplessness “is a catalyst for immoral behavior.” Prior to eating from the Tree of Knowledge,
Adam and Eve knew right from wrong, good from bad. They were naked before they ate the forbidden
fruit and did not care. Prior to them eating the fruit, there was nothing immoral about their nudity. The
“immoral behavior” occurred when Adam and Eve disobeyed instructions and ate the forbidden
fruit, which they did while they were naked. Moreover, nowhere is shame linked to such immoral
behavior. Following the logic of Genesis and considering it as truth, it does not follow that God would
consider the nudity immoral. God intentionally left them naked in the garden in the first place. The
shame and embarrassment that Adam and Eve felt does not mean that their nudity is “evil.” These are
natural emotions that most people would feel if they suddenly realized they were completely naked in
public. Despite Judge Regan’s assumptions to the contrary, The Book of Genesis cannot definitively
support the notion that God considers a woman’s bare chest immoral.
112. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 567–68.
113. Even the most iconic ancient depictions of Adam and Eve from various regions show Eve
topless. See Adam and Eve in Abreha and Atsbeha Church, Ethiopia (circa 210 ACE); Mosaic in
Monreale Cathedral, Sicily, Italy (twelfth to thirteenth century); Ja´far al-Sādiq, Fālnāmeh (Book of
Omens), watercolor and gold on paper, Iran (Safavid Dynasty, 16th century); Albrecht Dürer, Adam and
Eve, engraving, Germany (1504) and Adam and Eve, oil on panel, Germany (1507); Raphael, Adam and
Eve fresco from Stanza della Segnatura, Vatican (1509-1511); Lucas Cranach the Elder, Adam and Eve
in Paradise ( T he Fall), oil on beech wood, Germany (1526); and Titian, The Fall of Man, oil on canvas,
Italy (1550).
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world’s holiest sites. It is unlikely that anyone would even consider these images
immoral because they depict Eve’s bare chest. In fact, even the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed with the notion that “the female breast has from time
immemorial been the subject of high artistic expression in great, publicly displayed
sculpture and painting.”114 Even some laws, like the Los Angeles ordinance that
inspired this Note, have exceptions for depictions of toplessness for artistic
purposes in certain public spaces.115 Thus, if a woman brought a painting of a
topless Aphrodite, Venus, or Eve to the beach, she may not violate the law, but if
she herself was topless, she would violate it. Some may argue that allowing female
topless sunbathing would cause issues for parents who wish to instill the values of
modesty in their children who would equate the exposure of topless sunbathers to
subjecting their child to pornography. This is at best a secondary argument against
public toplessness, and one that has not been tested by the courts. Although parents
have the right to control the upbringing, and to some extent education, of their
children,116 this right is not absolute and should not be a sufficient justification for
an infringement on a woman’s rights. Furthermore, such claims negate the potential
important lessons that public toplessness could teach children. For example, the
very valuable lessons of how to feel comfortable in one’s skin and to normalize the
human body in its various forms.
B. Degrading, Demeaning, and Humiliating Reliance on Combating Sexual Violence
Another argument that proponents rely on is that topless prohibitions are
necessary to prevent sexual violence. This argument too is invalid because it relies
on an “overbroad generalization” about men and women and may be more of an
ad hoc justification for the ban of this form of toplessness. Like the morality
argument, this explanation is the same one that the court acknowledged in its nude
dancing cases. In LaRue, the Court upheld the California Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control regulation prohibiting nude dancing in establishments licensed to
sell alcohol as valid under the First Amendment.117 The regulation promulgated by
the Department only prohibited the “displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva, and
genitals”118 and did not prohibit the displaying of the breast. The Court took note
of the Department’s “numerous incidents of legitimate concern,” which included
incidents where:
114. United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 116 n.4 (4th Cir. 1999) (agreeing with this point but
noting that it was irrelevant to the issue of whether intentional exposure of the full female breast in
public places at the whim of the actor is constitutionally protected).
115. L.A., CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17.04.480(C.) (1975).
116. The Supreme Court repeatedly recognizes parents’ right to control the upbringing of their
children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce
v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). However, such a right
is not absolute. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (upholding a child labor statute which
prohibited a young child from soliciting for the Jehovah’s Witnesses at her parent’s direction and stating
that “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest”).
117. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 109 (1972).
118. Id. at 111–12.
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Customers were found engaging in oral copulation with women
entertainers; customers engaged in public masturbation; and customers
placed rolled currency either directly into the vagina of a female entertainer,
or on the bar in order that she might pick it up herself . . . .
Prostitution occurred in and around such licensed premises, and involved
some of the female dancers. Indecent exposure to young girls, attempted
rape, rape itself, and assaults on police officers took place on or
immediately adjacent to such premises.119
In his dissent, Justice Marshall questioned the veracity of the interest in
preventing “sex crimes, drug abuse, prostitution, and a wide variety of other
evils.”120 He noted how they are the “same interests that have been asserted time
and again before [the] Court as justification for laws banning frank discussion of
sex and that we have consistently rejected.”121 Additionally, he questioned “the
empirical link between sex-related entertainment and the criminal activity popularly
associated” which had “never been proven and, indeed, has now been largely
discredited.”122
Nearly all of the incidents that the California Department cited involved
exposure of the vagina, and not the breast.123 In fact, the Department, noting these
incidents, felt that it was unnecessary to extend the ban to topless dancing.124 Thus,
banning innocent, benign, non-sexual toplessness for those same reasons cited
above is disingenuous. If topless dancing’s “erotic message”125 was not of concern
for California in LaRue despite those incidents of sexual violence, it is disingenuous
to use those same incidents to ban benign, innocent, non-sexual toplessness, such
as sunbathing, swimming, or cooling off.
The argument that banning toplessness is necessary to combat sexual violence
sends a degrading message to both men and women and is not an exceedingly
persuasive justification to condone this prohibition. Just as the Defense of Marriage
Act and state prohibitions of sodomy and same-sex marriage demeaned, degraded,
and humiliated our fellow human beings who are homosexual,126 prohibitions of
female toplessness demean women and degrade men. These laws humiliate men and
women. They strip every person of his or her humanity. These laws tell women that
their bodies are obscene, while at the same time telling men that they are unable to
trust their ability to control themselves around persons of the opposite sex.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 131 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 27
(1970) and Robert B. Cairns, James C.N. Paul & Julius Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of
Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 111.
124. Id. at 112.
125. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991).
126. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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These laws further the practice of putting the majority of the burden on
women to avoid getting sexually harassed and raped,127 rather than encouraging men
to take an active role128 and teaching men not to harass and assault women.129 By
forcing a woman not to go topless in public, in fear that it would invite unwanted
attention, the law is tacitly condoning the bad behavior.
C. A Breast is a Breast: All Breasts are Erogenous
Some state courts have concluded that the Equal Protection Clause does not
prohibit female toplessness laws, reasoning that female breasts are sufficiently
different than male breasts, as only the former constitute an erogenous zone, and
that society understands female breasts to be an element of nudity or one’s private
areas, but not male breasts.130 This is not an important governmental interest in and
of itself, but it is an argument that has been consistently used to justify this
discrimination.
While “nature, not the legislative body, created the distinction between that
portion of a woman’s body and that of a man’s torso,”131 the legislature and courts
127. Julie Beck, The Different Stakes of Male and Female Birth Control, ATLANTIC, Nov. 1,
2016,
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/11/the-different-stakes-of-male-andfemale-birth-control/506120/ [ https://perma.cc/B7W2-5QWL] (discussing how women have to
bear the burdens of birth control as opposed to men, especially in light of the discontinuation of the
trial of male birth control); Tara Culp-Ressler, All of the Things Women Are Supposed to Do to
Prevent Rape, THINKPROGRESS ( June 10, 2014, 7:50 PM ), https://thinkprogress.org/all-of-thethings-women-are-supposed-to-do-to-prevent-rape-b9365bf520c1#.wx8hvp1sn [ https://perma.cc/
QZ7T-S7XS] (a compilation of some of the many sexist and burdensome measures women are
expected to take to prevent getting raped); Sexual Harassment Policy Office, What You Can Do to Stop
Sexual Harassment, STAN. U., https://harass.stanford.edu/take-action/what-you-can-do-stop-sexualharassment [ https://perma.cc/Z3EV-NUHB] ( last visited June 3, 2018) (guide for students on how
to stop sexual harassment).
128. The Pledge, IT’S ON US CAMPAIGN, https://shop.itsonus.org/pages/about-us
[ https://perma.cc/V54E-8NAP] ( last visited June 3, 2018) (“I pledge [t]o RECOGNIZE that nonconsensual sex is sexual assault[;] [t]o IDENTIFY situations in which sexual assault may occur[;] [t]o
INTERVENE in situations where consent has not or cannot be given[;] [and] [t]o CREATE an
environment in which sexual assault is unacceptable and survivors are supported.”); see also Barack
Obama, Glamour Exclusive: President Barack Obama Says, “This Is What a Feminist Looks Like,”
GLAMOUR MAG., Aug. 4, 2016, http://www.glamour.com/story/glamour-exclusive-president-barackobama-says-this-is-what-a-feminist-looks-like [ https://perma.cc/PU72-RELJ] (“It is absolutely men’s
responsibility to fight sexism too. And as spouses and partners and boyfriends, we need to work hard
and be deliberate about creating truly equal relationships.”).
129. Zerlina Maxwell, Stop Telling Women How to Not Get Raped, EBONY, Jan. 14, 2012,
http://www.ebony.com/news-views/stop-telling-women-how-to-not-get-raped [ https://perma.cc/
Q6B9-JFNA] (“Holding women and girls accountable for preventing sexual assault hasn’t worked and
so long as men commit the majority of rapes, men need to be at the heart of our tactics for preventing
them. Let’s stop teaching ‘how to avoid being a victim’ and instead, attack the culture that creates
predators in the first place.”); see also Larry Harris Jr., Do Not Rape and Teach Your Sons Not to Rape,
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 8, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larry-harris-jr/do-not-rape-andteach-you_b_11342100.html [https://perma.cc/2BPY-5SCD].
130. See generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Regulation of Exposure of Female, But Not
Male, Breasts, 67 A.L.R.5th 431 (1999).
131. Eckl v. Davis, 51 Cal. App. 3d 831, 848 (1975) (upholding a Los Angeles County public
nudity ordinance against an Equal Protection challenge on the grounds that the classification was
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perpetuated it. The distinction is only in the function of the breast: a woman’s
breasts are made to nourish her young children, whereas a man’s ordinarily are not.
However, even this may not be the case anymore, as recent studies show that men
may be able to breastfeed if exposed to enough estrogen.132 Finally, while most laws
that prohibit female toplessness provide exceptions for breastfeeding,133 the law
does not address why exposure of the breast to breastfeed is acceptable, where
exposure for exposure’s sake is not. Both scenarios involve a woman being topless
in public—a mother breastfeeding in public for convenience or necessity, or a
woman choosing to go topless to sunbathe or cool off (just like a man could). Even
if there is no purpose or necessity for removing one’s shirt, the law clearly denies a
woman this right but grants it to a man without question.
Recently, a district court in Colorado agreed with this assertion and granted a
preliminary injunction of the City of Fort Collins’s toplessness ordinance in part
because it found the City’s argument regarding the inherent physical differences
between male and female breasts unconvincing. The court reasoned that “while
inherent physical differences can in some circumstances be a permissible basis for
differential treatment by the government, . . . that is not the difference between the
sexes on which [the City’s ordinance] is based.”134 The court noted that based on
the record, the ordinance was based on the generalized notion that, regardless of a
woman’s intent, the exposure of her breasts in public (or even in her private home
if viewable by the public) is necessarily a sexualized act.
While one may hope that the most recent Free the Nipple case may be an
indication of how courts may rule in the future, unfortunately, that case is not the
norm. Courts in California, Indiana, New York, and Washington have blatantly
ignored science and common logic in favor of society’s unfounded sexist notions.135
For example, in a 1978 Washington case,136 the court disregarded physician
testimony (regarding how the breasts have the same composition and are not
primarily sexual organs, and that the development of the breast is not dictated by

reasonable only because “nudity . . . of women is commonly understood to include the uncovering of
the breasts.”). Fortunately, Eckl is no longer good law because it applied faulty reasoning and a standard
of review that gave the benefit of the doubt to the government, a standard that gave the government
the upper hand and was struck down by the California Supreme Court in Morris v. Mun. Court, 652
P.2d 51 (Cal. 1982).
132. Jared Diamond, Father’s Milk, DISCOVER, Feb. 1, 1995, http://discovermagazine.com/
1995/feb/fathersmilk468 [ https://perma.cc/76LP-7978]; see also Nikhil Swaminthan, Strange but True:
Males Can Lactate, SCI. AM., Sept. 6, 2007, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/strange-buttrue-males-can-lactate/ [https://perma.cc/8UUR-FGU3].
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.3 (West 2018) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
mother may breastfeed her child in any location, public or private, except the private home or residence
of another, where the mother and the child are otherwise authorized to be present.”).
134. Free the Nipple—Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1132
(D. Colo. 2017) (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
135. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991); People v. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d 564
(1989); City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918 (1978) (en banc).
136. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918 (en banc).
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gender)137 and instead agreed with the city council’s finding that female but not
male breasts constitute an erogenous zone and are associated with sexual arousal.138
The court also ruled that the council had a legitimate goal of encouraging the privacy
of those body parts used for procreative and reproductive functions.139
The problem with courts’ conclusions like the one above, that women’s
breasts can be targeted because they are sexual or erogenous,140 is that they assume
that men’s breasts cannot be erogenous. However, this is false. Scientists and even
some courts have acknowledged that the male chest is part of his erogenous zones.
141 Further, many individuals believe that a man’s chest is his most arousing
feature.142 However, the courts that have addressed female toplessness have simply
concluded that there is a difference between a male and female breast, without
acknowledging this or any other point.
Justifications for the distinction that a woman’s breasts are erogenous and a
man’s are not also neglect physiology, which finds few differences between the male
and female breast.143 As depicted below, the female breast is made up of fat, nipple,
glands, or alveoli, and a network of ducts through which milk can pass from the

137.

Id. at 919–20.
The doctor was not asked and did not say whether there is any difference in function
between the male and female breasts, and we see that the appellants agree that there is such
a difference. They give it no weight, however, evidently because, as they view the legislative
intent, function is not an element which the legislative body had in mind when it forbade
the public exposure of female breasts.
We are unable to agree that the legislative body could only have been interested in the
size or shape of female breasts when it included them among the parts of the human body
which should not be exposed in public.
Id. at 920.
138. Id. at 920.
139. Id. (“When the legislative intent is viewed in light of the obvious purpose of the ordinance–
to protect the public morals and its concern for the privacy of intimate functions–common knowledge
tells us, as it undoubtedly told the trial judge, that there is a real difference between the sexes with
respect to breasts, which is reasonably related to the preservation of public decorum and morals.”).
140. United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The important government
interest is the widely recognized one of protecting the moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of
society that still does not want to be exposed willy-nilly to public displays of various portions of their
fellow citizens’ anatomies that traditionally in this society have been regarded as erogenous zones. These
still include (whether justifiably or not in the eyes of all) the female, but not the male, breast.”) (citations
omitted); Craft v. Hodel, 683 F. Supp. 289, 300 (D. Mass. 1988) (upholding NPS regulation barring
female toplessness and public nudity on the grounds that there are “physical difference between the
sexes which has implications for the moral and aesthetic sensitivities of a substantial majority of the
country.”); State v. Vogt, 775 A.2d 551, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“. . . [It is] not just the
size of the breast exposed that is at the heart of the male-female distinction. Indeed, while one could
infer from the photographs admitted at trial some men are more full breasted than some women, it is
the public sensitivity in the case of women which is at stake.”). See generally Winbush, supra note 130, at
453–57.
141. Glazer, supra note 58, at 128.
142. Id.
143. Roy Levin & Cindy Meston, Nipple/Breast Stimulation and Sexual Arousal in Young Men
and Women, 3 J. SEXUAL MED. 450 (2006).
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glands to the nipples. The glands produce the milk and the ducts transport it.144
Men’s breasts are also made up of fat, nipple, and ducts.

Figure 1 Male and Female breast compared

The only anatomical difference is that a woman’s breast has “lobes” which contains
the mammary glands and ducts. Since men actually have the biological scaffold to
breastfeed, and just have to be exposed to the right hormonal cocktail of
progesterone, estrogen, oxytocin, and prolactin,145 this is not a true distinction.
Thus, differences between a man and a woman’s breast are mainly aesthetic and
socially imposed, which cannot be enough to justify a discriminatory law.
III. STIGMATIZATION OF WOMEN’S BODIES
The stigma that women experience as a result of their breasts is uniquely
female. From the moment their bodies begin to develop, a woman’s body is
sexualized in a way that a man’s is not. However, the justifi cations for this are
144. Male and Female Breast, DREAMSTIME.COM, http://thumbs.dreamstime.com/z/malefemale-breast-anatomy-12436234.jpg [ https://perma.cc/SF9S-UMEV] (last visited June 3, 2018).
145. Thomas H. Kunz & David J. Hosken, Male Lactation: Why, Why Not, and Is It Care?, 24
TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 80 (2009). Additionally, breastfeeding males are not uncommon
in the animal world; male fruit bats actually breastfeed their newborns. Charles M. Francis et al., Lactation
in Male Fruit Bats, 367 NATURE 691 (1994).
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entirely unfounded. As discussed above, men’s and women’s breasts can both
experience pleasure, they are made up of the same anatomical structures, and in
some cases, men’s breasts can be larger than women’s breasts;146 yet only a woman
is punished for the way society views her breasts. Even where public breastfeeding
is legal, women are still stigmatized and harassed for feeding their children.147
Topless prohibitions are only one example of the many ways that the law punishes
a woman for being a woman. However, it is one of the only areas where the law
explicitly treats a woman differently than a man. In other areas of law, a woman is
able to enjoy the same rights as her male counterparts, except when it comes to
what a woman can do with her body.
The government may posit that these laws are not a serious deprivation
because women can show cleavage and wear bikini tops, just as the Court did in
Barnes.148 However, this trivializes the whole struggle. Women are not able to be
topless in public because the government deems their breasts obscene and overtly
sexual. Every day a woman has to cover her breasts is another day when her body
is deemed lesser than a man’s. Her body is deemed sexual and a man’s is not.
However, these are all based on heterosexual male-dominated views and do not
reflect all of society.
Courts have often relied on traditional societal views to consistently shut
women out. They used this reasoning to deny Myra Bradwell admission to the
Illinois Bar,149 and to forbid women from becoming bartenders150 and from
working the same hours151 and for the same wages152 as men. These rulings may
have worked 100 years ago, but they cannot persist today. Traditional societal views
frustrate modern civil rights, including interracial marriage, desegregation of
schools, and same-sex marriage. These views have very little connection to science
and modern society. This is the next frontier in the Women’s Movement. Just as

146. Gynecomastia is a condition where the breast tissue of boys and men swell and
becomes tender. Studies show that about 70% of all boys develop pubertal gynecomastia and up to
two-thirds of all adult men might have palpable breast tissue on examination. Harmeet S. Narula &
Harold E. Carlson, Gynaecomastia—Pathophysiology, Diagnosis and Treatment, 10 NATURE REVIEWS
ENDOCRINOLOGY 684, 684, 688 (2014).
147. Terri Peters, See How Strangers Awesomely Defend Mom Bullied for Breastfeeding at
Target, TODAY, June 16, 2016, http://www.today.com/parents/see-how-strangers-awesomelydefended-mom-bullied-breastfeeding-target-t98776 [ https://web.archive.org/web/20160617133421/
https://www.today.com/parents/see-how-strangers-awesomely-defended-mom-bullied-breastfeedingtarget-t98776] (a video of a woman being verbally assaulted by a man for breastfeeding her four-week
old daughter in a Connecticut Target. Before the video started, the man apparently told the woman:
“Can’t you do that somewhere else? . . . That’s fucking disgusting. . . . You are nasty . . . you are fucking
disgusting . . . you are fucking disgusting . . . you are fucking disgusting . . . you whore”).
148. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 587 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Pasties
and a G-string moderate the expression to some degree, to be sure, but only to a degree. Dropping the
final stitch is prohibited, but the limitation is minor when measured against the dancer’s remaining
capacity and opportunity to express the erotic message.”).
149. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 130 (1873).
150. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 464 (1948).
151. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
152. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overturning Adkins v. Children’s
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and declaring the federal minimum wage legislation for women was an
unconstitutional infringement of liberty of contract).
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the Women’s Movement of the 1960s and 1970s exposed the discrimination and
harassment women faced in the workforce, it is time to expose the discrimination
and harassment imposed on women’s bodies by our laws. Women are making gains
in all aspects of life: they dominate universities and post-graduate programs; they
are in board rooms and court rooms; they can be Supreme Court justices and even
Presidential nominees, and one day soon, Presidents. Yet, despite all of these gains,
a woman’s body is still legally and socially treated as a sexual object, subservient to
a man’s.
Additionally, these laws can have other ramifi cations such as criminal or
professional punishments. A woman who chose to sunbathe topless in a jurisdiction
with a prohibition may have a criminal record for doing something that would be
perfectly legal as a man. In most cases the woman would get a misdemeanor and be
jailed or fi ned, making women criminals for doing something that a man can do
legally.
Women can fi nd the sight of man’s chest erotic and some men can also
get aroused from breast and nipple stimulation.153 However, men do not experience
the same treatment as women with regards to their chest. As Reena Glazer
eloquently notes:
The (heterosexual) male myth of a woman’s breast has been codified into
law. Because women are the sexual objects and property of men, it follows
that what might arouse men can only be displayed when men want to be
aroused … . No consideration [is] given to contexts in which women
might enjoy going topless for their own reasons, regardless of any effect
on male viewers. Nor [is] any consideration given to the fact that women
might not be bothered by the sight of other women’s breasts.154
Unfortunately, this “myth” has also sexualized women at the fi rst signs of
development. At a young age, girls are taught to self-objectify; by middle school,
many are already confronted with the reality that they are sexual objects.155 The
reality that girls and women face is not rooted in anything but social views of what
is sexually appealing.156 Because this perspective gives no consideration for other
benign uses of being topless, many can never divorce the sight of a topless woman
from something of sexual pleasure. It is no wonder why many laws are justifi ed on
the basis of offending other people. For instance, in many cases, these laws were
designed to protect non-consenting viewers. The ordinance in Newport Beach for
example was passed for this exact purpose,157 to expressly codify the view that a
153. Levin & Meston, supra note 143.
154. Glazer, supra note 58, at 116–17.
155. Marinda Valenti, What Do Dress Codes Say About Girls’ Bodies, MS. MAG. BLOG (May
24, 2013), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2013/05/24/what-do-dress-codes-say-about-girls-bodies/
[ https://perma.cc/2DV5-8Q3D].
156. Id.; see also Milstead, supra note 45, at 282 (“Our court is not authorized, however, to take
judicial notice of the concept that the breasts of female topless dancers, unlike their male counterparts,
are commonly associated with sexual arousal. Such a viewpoint might be subject to reasonable dispute,
depending on the sex and sexual orientation of the viewer.” (citing Williams v. City of Fort Worth, 782
S.W.2d 290, 297 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989))).
157. NEWPORT BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 10.54 (1996) (The City Council finds that it is
both in the public interest and necessary to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare
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woman’s breasts are offensive and obscene sends a message to women that their
bodies are obscene.
IV. FEMALE TOPLESSNESS CAN GAIN SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE
There are many instances throughout the civil rights and women’s
movements where the status quo needed to change in order for society to progress,
and this is one of them. Until 1967, the status quo in many parts of the country was
that interracial marriage was forbidden.158 The Supreme Court declared that ban
unconstitutional, and today, no one would consider such a marriage anything but a
joyous union between two individuals who love each other.159 Until 1975, it was
common for states to exclude women from jury service,160 and yet today, men and
women throughout the country all get to share the pleasure of being called for (and
trying to avoid) jury duty. Until 1984, it was common for many law fi rms to
discriminate on the basis of sex in promoting lawyers to the partnership;161 such a
thing could never overtly happen today. Until 1996, many women were unable to
attend the same military universities as men,162 and now women make up at about
20 percent of the graduating classes of the nation’s most prestigious military
universities.163 More recently, until late 2015, women were not able to hold the same
combat positions as men,164 but now they are. The de-stigmatization of women’s
and that said parks, playgrounds and beaches be utilized and enjoyed by as many persons as possible;
that maximum utilization and enjoyment of said parks, playgrounds and beaches can only be obtained
through imposition of regulations regarding activities thereon; the periods of some persons utilizing said
parks, playgrounds and beaches by appearing thereon without clothing and with the private parts of
their bodies exposed, unreasonably interferes with the rights of all persons to use and enjoy said parks,
playgrounds and beaches by causing many persons to leave and others not to use said parks,
playgrounds and beaches; . . . that the presence of persons who are unclothed and exposed to public
view in or on public rights-of-way, parks, playgrounds and beaches, or on any private property open to
public view from public parks, playgrounds, beaches or other public ways tends to discourage the use and
enjoyment of said public parks, playgrounds, beaches and public ways of the City, and creates a nuisance
and is offensive to members of the public who wish to use and enjoy said public parks, playgrounds,
beaches and places and who are unwillingly exposed to such conduct) (emphasis added); see also Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991).
158. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
159. Id.
160. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 522 (1975).
161. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
162. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515 (1996).
163. The 2015 graduating class of the Naval Academy had 204 female students out
of 1070 students, and the 2016 graduating class of the Air Force Academy had 182 female students out
of 812 students. Class of 2015 Statistics, U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY ( M ay 22 2015 8:19 AM ),
https://www.usna.edu/NewsCenter/2015/05/class-of-2015-statistics.php [ https://perma.cc/X5MJYWEH]; U.S. Air Force Acad. Pub. Affairs, Academy Releases Class of ‘16 Stats, U.S. AIR FORCE
ACAD. ( June 1, 2016), http://www.usafa.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/788557/academyreleases-class-of-16-stats/ [ https://perma.cc/37LT-4BCP]. Unfortunately, VMI still has quite a way to
go; in 2015, VMI had 183 female students, out of a student body of 1717. Common Data Set: Fall 2016,
VA. MIL. INST., http://www.vmi.edu/media/content-assets/documents/assessment/CDS_20162017.pdf [ https://perma.cc/7YG8-KDM5] ( last visited June 3, 2018).
164. Dep’t of Def., Secretary of Defense Ash Carter Opens All Jobs to Women - 12/3/2015,
YOUTUBE (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8d3cI_Kcgwk; see also Bill Chappell,
Pentagon Says Women Can Now Serve in Front-Line Ground Combat Positions, NPR, Dec. 3, 2015,
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/03/458319524/pentagon-will-allow-women-in-
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bodies vis-à-vis female toplessness is the next frontier. If the military, which is
generally slow to react to social changes,165 is fi nally able to acknowledge that a
woman is equal to a man in combat and education, and possibly the draft,166 the
rest of society needs to catch up.
A. Pushing the Limits
Societal pressures on women to look a certain way are nearly universal.167
This pressure is applied through laws and social norms. Society also imposes cruel
and harsh punishments on a woman who does not fi t this model—if she shows too
much skin, she is “asking for it,” or is called awful names. Society has expected
women to be chaste and modest. However, throughout history there are instances
where women tried to break this mold simply by changing what they wore when
they went to the beach or out in the town. For example, in 1907, Annette Kellerman,
an Australian swimmer, was arrested for wearing a fi tted, sleeveless bathing suit in
Boston.168 A famous image by the National Photo Company shows a Washington
D.C. swimsuit policeman measuring the distance between women’s knees and
bathing suits in 1922, when at that time the rule was that suits could not be over six
inches above the knee.169 Today, women can wear anything they want at the beach,
except a monokini.170
frontline-ground-combat-positions [https://web.archive.org/web/20180417180804/https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/03/458319524/pentagon-will-allow-women-in-frontline-groundcombat-positions].
165. For example, the military only recently repealed Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. DON’T ASK
DON’T TELL REPEAL ACT OF 2010, 111 Pub. L. 321, 124 Stat. 3515 (Enacted Dec. 22, 2010); see also
CLIFFORD L. STANLEY, MEMORANDUM RE: REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL,” (2011),
http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_dadt/USD-PR-DADT_Repeal_Day_Memo_
20Sep.pdf [ https://perma.cc/DK98-T8JV]; Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20180510083232/https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/
23military.html ].
166. As this Note was written, President Obama announced that he would be willing to open
the draft to women. See Josh Lederman, Obama Administration Supports Requiring Women to Register
for Military Draft, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2016, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/
white-house-announces-support-women-military-draft/ [ https://perma.cc/PBL2-BNBW].
167. Across the globe, there are accounts of widespread pressure to look good. See PARDIS
MAHDAVI, PASSIONATE UPRISINGS: IRAN’S SEXUAL REVOLUTION 31, 134 (2009); ANGELA
B. MCCRACKEN, THE BEAUTY TRADE: YOUTH, GENDER, AND FASHION GLOBALIZATION (2014);
Susanne Helfert & Petra Warschburger, The Face of Appearance-Related Social Pressure: Gender, Age
and Body Mass Variations in Peer and Parental Pressure During Adolescence, CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY & MENTAL HEALTH, May 2013.
168. It was seen as acceptable in Australia, but prohibited in the United States. See Kristin
Toussaint, This Woman’s One-Piece Bathing Suit Got Her Arrested in 1907, BOSTON.COM, July 2, 2015,
https://www.boston.com/news/history/2015/07/02/this-womans-one-piece-bathing-suit-got-herarrested-in-1907 [ https://web.archive.org/web/20171115095006/https://www.boston.com/news/
history/2015/07/02/this-womans-one-piece-bathing-suit-got-her-arrested-in-1907].
169. Swimsuit Police Check the Length of Swimmers’ Ensembles in Amazing Re-colorized 1922
Photo, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 6, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/06/
swimsuit-police_n_3713153.html [ https://perma.cc/SA5X-X364].
170. A monokini is a swimsuit which consists of only a close fitting bottom. It was first created
in 1964 by Rudi Gernreich, and the initial versions consisted of a brief that went from the upper thigh
to the midriff and had two thin straps that tied around the neck. Modern ones are much simpler, and
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If female toplessness was as legal in this country as male toplessness is, it
would eventually gain social acceptance just as male toplessness did eighty years ago.
Today, men are free to expose their chests in public with “no consideration of the
impact on possible views.”171 However, until the 1930s, male toplessness was
banned in most parts of the country for the same reasons women’s toplessness is
today. In 1936, Westchester, New York became one of the fi rst cities to permit male
toplessness at the beach.172 Only two years before, eight men were fi ned $1 for
being topless at Coney Island beach. In condoning the men, the presiding
magistrate, exhibiting a similar objectifying tone when discussing the men’s body,
said: “All of you fellows may be Adonises but there are many people who object to
seeing so much of the human body exposed.” In 1935, forty-two men were arrested
for being topless in Atlantic City and were fi ned $84. The city fathers referred to
the men as “gorillas.” Now, no one refers to a topless man as an animal; no one
refers to a topless man as anything besides someone dressed appropriately for the
beach. It did not take long for male toplessness to gain social acceptance and
popularity. Three years after the Atlantic City incident, Life Magazine published
images of various male topless beachgoers of various ages and donning different
styles of “the topless suit.”173 Rather than calling the men “gorillas,” the article
changed its tone and simply provides the caption below.

resemble a bikini bottom. See Eleanor Nanble, Topless Swimsuit Causes Commotion, CHI. TRIB., June 10,
1964.
171. Glazer, supra note 58, at 116.
172. Irving Wallace et al., Men Arrested for Topless Bathing, READING EAGLE PARADE, Oct. 3,
1982, at 19.
173. Men Now Bathe Topless on Many Public Beaches, LIFE MAG., July 18, 1938.
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Society has proven willing to grow and adapt with the times as it did with
male toplessness. Society will change and progress as it has done in many other
areas.174 It just needs to be given the opportunity to do so.
B. Using Media to Normalize Breasts
Covered or not, breasts make a woman an instant target for unwanted
attention. Part of the reason for this is that, through depictions of women’s bodies
in media, people have grown accustomed to associating a woman’s breasts with
something overtly sexual and objectifi ed. It is no wonder why society expects men
to act like barbarians at the sight of a breast, because society has essentially trained
men to associate the sight of a woman’s breast as something purely sexual.175
The best way to stop propagating this conditioning of men is by
normalizing female toplessness in reality. The signifi cance of the growing depictions
of women’s bodies and breasts in television and fi lm is twofold. On the one hand,
as mentioned above, the depictions have likely increased men’s view of women as
either sexual objects, reproductive, or maternal fi gures; but on the other, society is
also growing more used to seeing women’s breasts. No one could forget what
happened to Janet Jackson during the 2004 Superbowl Halftime Show and how
CBS was not only fi ned, but Jackson herself was the subject of Congressional
hearings and had her reputation tarnished.176 But over ten years later, the Halftime
show incident has largely become a thing of the past. Today, toplessness is not as
taboo as it once was. Even the popular television show Modern Family poked fun
at America’s prudishness in an episode where the family goes on a vacation to
174. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015).
175. L. Monique Ward, Ann Merriwether & Allison Caruthers, Breasts Are for Men: Media,
Masculinity Ideologies, and Men’s Beliefs About Women’s Bodies, 9 SEX ROLES 55 (2006).
176. See Milstead, supra note 45, at 273.
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Australia and the two teenage boy characters are searching for topless sunbathers.
According to the episode’s synopsis on ABC, while on their Australian vacation
Luke and Manny, the two teenaged boys in the series, want to see “boobs at topless
Bondi Beach.”177 When the boys fi nally do see a topless sunbather, Luke is so
spooked that he loses his swimming trunks in the ocean, and a topless swimmer
helps him fi nd them. The joke of the episode was that the boys were “searching”
for topless sunbathers, only to be spooked once they fi nally saw one. Surprisingly,
many of the reviews of the episode barely even mentioned that scene. This is one
of the most popular shows on television; if it can normalize toplessness in other
countries without any signifi cant backlash, then perhaps through similar depictions,
the American people will grow more accustomed to it.
CONCLUSION
For decades, women have tried to address this issue through the political
process and have not been successful. While some state courts were strong allies for
this movement in the 1980s and 1990s, there were also many who further damaged
the movement. In the 1980s and 1990s there have been a few successful state court
decisions in New York and California regarding topless dancing. Since 2014, there
have been numerous protests regarding female toplessness but legal efforts have
largely halted since the early 1990s, with the exception of the most recent failed
attempt of Sonoko Tagami in Illinois178 and the successful Equal Protection
challenge by Free the Nipple.179 The most recent district court decision is promising;
however, there is a long way to go.
The fact that a woman cannot go topless in public in most states and cities
in this country is indicative of a larger problem with the treatment of women in our
society, which affects all women, regardless of age, race, or sexual identity, and
whether they would choose to go topless. Repealing these laws is about ensuring
that a woman can stand on equal footing under the law to a man. It is about ensuring
that if a woman is required to give up a part of her freedom, that it is justifi ed and
based on sound logic, and not the remnants of antiquated social norms. The Equal
Protection Clause ensures that inherent differences do not allow for discriminatory
treatment under the law. The issues that female toplessness raises are indicative of
the greater problem of the way the law treats women. In order to get true equality
under the law for women, the law needs to view a woman and her body as equal to
177. Modern Family, Australia, Season 5 Episode 20 (Apr. 23, 2014).
178. Sonoko Tagami v. City of Chicago, No. 14 cv 9074 (E.D. Ill. 2015). For a discussion about
some of the recent social movements behind female toplessness, see Take Two,
Should it Be Legal for Women to Go Topless in Public? (Poll), 89.3KPCC, Sept. 26, 2013,
http://www.scpr.org/programs/take-two/2013/09/26/33923/should-it-be-legal-for-women-to-gotopless-in-publ/ [ https://perma.cc/N2R5-JT5U], and Jessica Blankenship, The Social and
Legal Arguments for Allowing Women to Go Topless in Public, ATLANTIC, Sept. 18, 2013,
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/the-social-and-legal-arguments-for-allowingwomen-to-go-topless-in-public/279755/ [https://perma.cc/7BLU-D3EC].
179. Free the Nipple—Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1126, 1130–
33 (D. Colo. 2017) (holding that the factors for a preliminary injunction weigh heavily in plaintiff’s
favor because the City’s justifications for the ban, namely, preserving morality, maintaining public
order, and protecting children, and the differences between the male and female breast are not sufficient
to justify the City’s gender-based discrimination).
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a man’s. A woman’s body is her vessel, just like a man’s is his. If the law cannot treat
this fundamental part of her as equal to her male counterparts, she will not be able
to expect the law to treat her equally in other ways. This is the fi rst step in the long
fi ght for true equity.

